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REAL OR PERSONAL?: THE AREA OF MUTUAL INTEREST
COVENANT IN THE WILLISTON BASIN AFTER
GOLDEN V. SM ENERGY COMPANY
ANDREW SCOTT GRAHAM

ABSTRACT
The recent resurgence of oil and gas development in the Williston
Basin has predictably been accompanied by a dramatic resurgence in oil
and gas leasing and assignment. Contemporary developers of existing
leaseholds often inadvertently inherit leases or agreements with divergent
priorities, as well as obligations that are simply incongruous with current
needs. With this resurgence has come a unique challenge to title
examination in appropriately defining the scope of inquiry where a
predecessor in title imposes affirmative obligations that have an uncertain
legal status with respect to mineral title. The legal uncertainty of certain
transactional tools is often tolerated where these tools are necessary to
permit collaboration and the meaningful structuring of risk, capital, and
resources in oil and gas plays. All the same, title examiners continually
look for clarification to assist their clients in appropriately evaluating and
limiting risks associated with transactions collateral to title. The North
Dakota Supreme Court’s recent decision in A. G. Golden v. SM Energy
Company assesses the legal status of the area of mutual interest agreements,
which is a transaction tool designed to increase the potential of mineral
development. This Article will identify a tension at the heart of the Court’s
analysis in A. G. Golden v. SM Energy Company as it concerns its treatment
of the AMI, and consider the implications of this tension on the future
treatment of AMIs as convents in North Dakota. From this analysis, the
paper asserts that assignees of mineral or leasehold title cannot foreclose the
possibility that an AMI can exist as a real covenant in North Dakota.
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INTRODUCTION

Oil and gas development in the Williston Basin began with a noncommercial well drilled in southeast North Dakota in 1892.1 Sustained
commercial drilling in the basin did not begin, however, until the 1950s.2
Since then, drilling has progressed through three successive cycles of
sustained oil and gas activity, the first cycle beginning in 1951, the second
in 1973 and the third in 1994.3 Most recently, in North Dakota, as in other
parts of the country, technological advancements in horizontal drilling and
recovery techniques have enabled a surge of oil and gas development.
Discoveries in the Parshall Oil Field in 2005 have set in motion North
Dakota’s fourth cycle of sustained development, which continues today.4
As development techniques have evolved, so too have issues relating to
property interests and leasing. Naturally, the incidence and complexity of
leasehold chains of title have increased after many cycles of sustained
development and leasing activity. Leasehold estates that survived the
1. United States Geological Survey Williston Basin Province Assessment Team, Executive
Summary—Assessment of Undiscovered Oil & Gas Resources of the Williston Basin Province of
North Dakota, Montana and South Dakota, at 4, available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/dds/dds069/dds-069-w/.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 17.
4. Anthony Effinger, Dakota Oil Fields of Saudi-Sized Reserves Make Farmers Drillers,
BLOOMBERG, June 3, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=ayj1uo_gdNI4. For example, the number of producing oil wells in the Bakken
formation has increased from a then historical high of 303 wells in 2007, to over 6,600 wells in
2013. N.D. Industrial Comm’n, Dep’t of Mineral Res., Oil and Gas Division, General Statistics,
https://www.dmr nd.gov/oilgas/stats/statisticsvw.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). The U.S.
Geological Survey estimates the presence of 3,844 million barrels of oil, 3,705 billion cubic feet
of gas and 202 million barrels of total natural gas liquids in the Williston Basin Province—with
the bulk of this undiscovered oil and gas residing within the Bakken formation. Id.
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production cycles of the mid-to-late twentieth century often survived with
priorities and concerns that contrast starkly with those of contemporary
development. This is due to, for example, changes in regulatory schemes,
increased acreage requirements for pooling obligations, need for greater
capital investment, and the increased sophistication and cost of recovery
techniques. These changes also increase cost barriers to developers
entering new plays and heighten the need for transactional tools that permit
collaboration and meaningful structuring of risk, capital, and resources.
Contemporary developers of existing leaseholds often inadvertently inherit
leases or agreements with divergent priorities, as well as obligations that are
simply incongruous with current needs and priorities. As a result, today’s
title examiners have the difficult but critical task of defining the scope of
inquiry where a predecessor in title imposes affirmative obligations that
may affect the nature of interest assumed by the client.
These challenges are nowhere better highlighted than in the recent
North Dakota Supreme Court decision in A. G. Golden v. SM Energy
Company,5 decided in February of 2013. The Golden Court assesses the
relevancy of a forty year old Area of Mutual Interest Agreement (“AMI”) in
the context of a dispute over the intent of lease operators in a fifteen year
old assignment.6 In general, the AMI is a contract to offer an option in
future acquired leasehold or mineral interests within a particular geographic
area.7 It functions (either as a provisional part of a larger agreement or
independently) to increase the probability of mineral and leasehold
development—in part because of its profound impact on title. Part of the
efficacy of the AMI depends on its binding effect on successors-in-interest,
whether that effect is achieved intentionally or through a party’s inadvertent
assumption of the burden.8 The AMI’s effect on title occupies an uncertain
legal status in many oil and gas producing states. Where courts have
encountered the AMI, they have reached significantly divergent conclusions
as to its appropriate classification as a covenant, and its impact on title.9
The recent decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court in Golden is
typical of this uncertainty. It raises a number of questions to the character
of the AMI and its relationship to title and the effected estates.

5. 2013 ND 17, 826 N.W.2d 610.
6. Id. ¶ 1, 826 N.W.2d at 613.
7. John S. Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 SW. L.J. 759, 844 (1987).
8. See generally Justin J. Quigley & Stephen Hull, Give What? To Whom? But Why? Area of
Interest Provisions in Mining Agreements, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 38-1 (2009); see also
Terry I. Cross, The Ties That Bind: Preemptive Rights and Restraints on Alienation That
Commonly Burden Oil and Gas Properties, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 193 (1999).
9. See generally Quigley & Hull, supra note 8.
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The proceeding discussion will first highlight a tension at the core of
the Court’s reasoning in Golden—between the Court’s implied
characterization of the AMI and the relationship of the AMI to the vested
leasehold.
This tension exposes the need for a more consistent
jurisprudence concerning the relationship of the AMI to demised estates.
Comparing the law of real covenants in North Dakota to the purpose and
function of the AMI, this Article asserts the following two theses: First, the
AMI ought to be characterized as a benefit to certain demised estates for
purposes of the real covenant analysis because of its intended and important
role in facilitating the development of estates bound by its obligations.
Second, following Golden, assignees of mineral or leasehold title cannot
foreclose the possibility that an AMI can exist as a real covenant in North
Dakota.
II. A.G. GOLDEN V. SM ENERGY COMPANY
A. G. Golden and several other plaintiffs (collectively, “Golden”)10
owned a number of oil and gas leases covering property in McKenzie
County, North Dakota. In July of 1970, Golden assigned these leases
(“Original Leasehold”) to Universal Resources Corporation (“Universal”).
In conjunction with the assignment of leases between Golden and
Universal, the parties executed an accompanying letter of agreement
(“Letter Agreement”) providing for a “joint area of interest” (i.e., the AMI).
The AMI obligated Golden to offer Universal any future leaseholds he
purchased within a defined geographic area in return for a four percent
overriding royalty interest and reciprocally obligated Universal to assign to
Golden a four percent overriding royalty interest in any leaseholds
Universal acquired within the same defined geographic area.11 The Letter

10. A. G. Golden was joined in the action by several other plaintiffs including: Paul E.
Nordstog, Cooper B. Land, Solveig K. Land, Howard D. Armentrout and Delores K. Armentrout,
as Co-Trustees of the Armentrout Family Revocable Living Trust dated May 24, 2005, Craig L.
Bolenbaugh, and Joseph Michael Bolenbaugh, Peter Francis Bolenbaugh and James Patrick
Bolenbaugh, as joint tenants, and Royalty Interests Partnership, LP.
11. Golden, ¶ 2, 826 N.W.2d at 613-14. The AMI provided in relevant part:
A joint area of interest is designated between the parties hereto and is described as All
of Sections 19, 20, 29, 30, 31 and 32 in Township 153 North, Range 95 West and all
of Section 2 in Township 152 North, Range 96 West. It is agreed that should A.G.
Golden purchase any leasehold interest within the above descirbed [sic] area, he will
offer it at cost to Universal Resources Corporation, subject to a reservation of four per
cent (4%) overriding royalty. Should Universal Resources Corporation purchase any
leasehold interest in the joint area of interest, they will assign a four percent (4%)
overriding royalty to A. G. Golden without cost. Said joint area of interest is shown
by Exhibit “B” (attached hereto and made a part hereof) . . . . Should production be
encountered on any acreage owned or controlled by Universal Resources Corporation
in the joint area of interest, the obligations of the parties hereto shall continue to each
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Agreement also provided that “[a]ny assignment of this agreement made by
[Universal] shall recite the terms and conditions of this agreement.”12 In
effect, the Letter Agreement obligated Universal to assign the AMI to any
successors-in-title. The Letter Agreement was recorded by the parties.
Universal purchased several leases during the 1980s within the
geographic area covered by the AMI, including the “Thompson Lease,” and
duly assigned to Golden a four percent overriding royalty interest in those
leases.13 In 1993, Universal assigned its interest in the Original Leases and
Thompson leases (lands covered by the AMI) to Tipperary Petroleum
Company (“Tipperary”).14 This assignment, known as the “UniversalTipperary assignment” provided that Universal had assigned: all right, title
and interest of [Universal] in and to . . . all operating agreements, joint
venture agreements, partnership agreements, and other contracts, to the
extent that they relate to any of the Assets.15
Later in 1993, Tipperary acquired an additional leasehold interest from
Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. in federal lands (“Federal Lease”)
also located within the geographic area of the AMI.16 Tipperary did not
assign any interest from the Federal Lease to Golden. In a third assignment
effective March 1, 2000, Tipperary assigned all of its interest in the
leases—including the Original Leases, Thompson and Federal Leases—and
its contractual rights and obligations to Nance Petroleum Corporation
(“Nance”).17 The assignment and bill of sale specified that Nance “assumes
all of Assignor’s duties, liabilities and obligations relating to the Assets to
which Assignor was a party or by which it was bound on and after the date
hereof.”18 Nance later merged into SM Energy Company (“SM Energy”).19
SM Energy operated a well situated within the drill spacing unit for the
Thompson and Federal Leases and paid Golden the royalties due under
production attributable to the Thompson lease, but not those attributable to
the Federal Lease that was originally acquired by Tipperary.20 Golden sued
other for so long as production continues . . . . The terms of this paragraph shall extend
to all new lease purchases, lease renewals lease extensions of any nature whatsoever.
Golden, ¶ 2, 826 N.W. 2d 610 at 613-14.
12. Id.
13. Id. An overriding royalty interest is an interest in production “carved out” of the working
interest in the lease. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW ABRIDGED, § 418 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MYERS].
14. Golden, ¶ 3, 826 N.W.2d at 613-14.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. ¶ 4.
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SM Energy in an action for declaratory judgment, to quiet title, and for an
accounting to recover royalties under the Federal Lease.21 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Golden, holding that SM Energy,
through its predecessor-in-interest, had assumed the obligations under the
AMI of the Letter Agreement. The trial court reasoned that the language of
the Universal-Tipperary assignment, Tipperary’s constructive notice of the
recorded Letter Agreement, and Tipperary’s acceptance of the benefit of the
assignment in light of North Dakota Century Code section 9-03-2522
demonstrated Tipperary’s intent to assume the obligation imposed by the
AMI included in the Letter Agreement. The trial court held that Tipperary,
and by extension SM Energy, assumed the obligation imposed by the AMI
as a matter of law. SM Energy subsequently appealed the order of the trial
court granting summary judgment.23
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the parties stipulate that
the AMI was a personal covenant, not a real covenant, and was subject to
the law of assignment.24 Pursuant to the law of assignment, the question of
whether SM Energy was obligated under the AMI turns upon whether the
parties had each assumed the obligation from their respective predecessorin-title.25 Because SM Energy had assumed all of Tipperary’s obligations,
the Court focused on the language of the Universal and Tipperary
assignment. Contrary to the trial court, the Court found the language of the
assignment to be ambiguous on whether Tipperary assumed the obligation
of the AMI under the Letter Agreement. Specifically, the Court observed
the language of the assignment could be rationally interpreted to either
include or exclude the AMI depending on how one treats the phrase “to the
extent.”26 The AMI provided, in relevant part, that Tipperary would
assume all “contracts . . . to the extent that they relate to any of the
Assets.”27 In light of this apparent ambiguity, the Court determined that
resolving the question of Tipperary’s intent to assume the AMI obligations

21. Id. Golden also sought accounting for payments on a production on a well located on the
subject property pursuant to an executed division order. See generally id. ¶¶ 23-26, 826 N.W.2d
at 619.
22. Id. ¶ 15, 826 N.W.2d at 617-18. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 9-03-25 provides: “A voluntary
acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising
from it so far as the facts are known or ought to be known to the person accepting.”
23. Golden, ¶ 6, 826 N.W.2d at 615.
24. Id. ¶ 9.
25. Id. ¶10.
26. Id. ¶ 13, 865 N.W.2d at 617 (citing Nichols v. Goughnor, 2012 ND 178, ¶ 12, 820
N.W.2d 740, 744 (N.D. 2002) (observing that “[a] contract is ambiguous when rational arguments
can be made for different interpretations.”)).
27. Id. ¶ 3, 865 N.W.2d at 614.
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under the Letter Agreement was a question of fact and reversed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment.
The law of assignment provides that a party may assume an obligation
explicitly or by implication.28 If an obligation was not explicitly assumed,
implicit assumption of the obligation “may be manifested by the parties’
conduct, the subject matter of the contract, the language of the assignment,
or the surrounding circumstances.”29 The Court concluded that nothing of
record provided any indication of Tipperary’s intent regarding the
assumption of the AMI.30 Responding to the reasoning of the trial court,
the Supreme Court observed that constructive notice of the obligation is not
determinative of intent to assume that obligation.31 Furthermore, the trial
court’s conclusion that Tipperary had assumed the benefit of the transaction
and therefore intended to assume the AMI’s obligation was misguided. The
Court observed that this conclusion begged the question whether a party
entered into the transaction in the first place.32 Instead, looking to the
language of the Universal-Tipperary assignment, the question the Court
remanded was as follows: did Universal and Tipperary intend for the AMI
to “relate” to the assigned assets? In summary, the North Dakota Supreme
Court resolved that SM had assumed Tipperary’s obligations, but the scope
of the obligations was uncertain. Golden’s holding turns upon the language
of and intent of the fifteen year old Universal-Tipperary assignment.
III. WAS THE AMI IN GOLDEN REALLY A REAL COVENANT?—A
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT.
A covenant is not a real covenant unless the executing parties intend it
to be.33 On this basis alone, the Golden Court can dismiss the notion that
the AMI functioned as a real covenant.34 But this is not where the Court
ended its analysis. The Golden Court characterized the AMI as a personal
covenant, citing Beeter v. Sawyer Disposal LLC,35 for the proposition that
28. Id. ¶ 10, 826 N.W.2d at 615-16 (citing 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 94, 485-86 (2004)).
29. Id.
30. Id. ¶¶ 12-14, 826 N.W.2d at 616-17.
31. Id. ¶ 14, 826 N.W.2d at 617.
32. Id. ¶ 16, 826 N.W.2d at 618 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-25 (providing that “[a]
voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations
arising from it so far as the facts are known or ought to be known to the person accepting.”)).
33. In Golden, the Court acknowledges that absent intent, a covenant cannot run with the
land. Golden, ¶ 9, 865 N.W.2d at 615 (citing Mountain W. Mines, Inc. v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron
Co. 376 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (D. Wyo. 2005), aff’d in part, 470 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding
that an AMI does not run with the land because the parties did not intend the AMI to run with the
land)).
34. Id.
35. 2009 ND 153, ¶¶ 13-14, 771 N.W.2d 282, 287.
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the AMI benefited the grantor personally and that the covenant served no
direct benefit to the land.36 This gratis dictum characterization of the AMI
begs the question—had the parties intended to execute a real covenant, does
it follow that the AMI did not benefited the land?
The facts of Beeter focus on a deed covenant requiring the grantee and
its successors-in-title to make perpetual payments to the grantor from the
gross revenues of a waste disposal business conducted on the demised
property.37 The grantors in the original conveyance sued after a successorin-title failed to remit payment pursuant to the covenant.38 To evaluate the
covenant, the Court applied section 47-04-26 of the North Dakota Code,
which provides that, “[a]ll covenants contained in a grant of an estate in real
property, which are made for the direct benefit of the property or some part
of it then in existence, run with the land.”39 The Court determined that the
benefit of the covenant (i.e., passive receipt of landfill profits) did not
“benefit” the land, but served only to personally benefit the grantor.
Alluding to Henry Bigelow’s real covenant analysis, the Beeter Court cites
Barton v. Fred Netterville, out of the Southern District of Mississippi,
observing that a covenant that is not “so related to the land as to enhance its
value and confer a benefit upon it does not run with the land . . . is a
collateral and personal obligation.”40 As a result, without a demonstrable
and direct benefit to the land, the covenant cannot bind successors-in-title
despite the intent of the original parties.41
The invocation of Beeter led to the conclusion that the AMI in Golden
did not provide a “direct benefit” to the leasehold assets, but instead
constituted only a personal benefit to Golden, the party seeking its
enforcement. Notably, the covenant at issue in Beeter can be reduced in
principal to an exchange of real property for a perpetual payment in
business profits. The Golden Court implicitly analogized the passive
receipt of future landfill profits in Beeter and the receipt of future
overriding profits from the oil and gas production from yet unacquired
properties. Pursuing this logic to its full extent, the benefit enjoyed by
Golden, according to the court, cannot be said to have “related” to the value
or use of the real estate interest he retained in the dominant estate—rather, it
cannot be said that the parties intended the AMI to relate to the assigned
36. Golden, ¶ 9, 865 N.W.2d 610 at 615.
37. Beeter, ¶ 2, 771 N.W.2d at 283-84.
38. Id.
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-26 (1999).
40. Beeter, ¶¶ 13-14, 771 N.W.2d at 286 (citing Barton v. Fred Netterville Lumber Co., 317
F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (S.D. Miss. 2004)).
41. Id.
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assets. In Beeter, the grantor clearly held an easement in gross, with no
adjoining right in the real estate; in contrast, the assignor in Golden retained
an interest in the property in the form of an overriding royalty interest. 42
While it is clear that the AMI provision personally benefited Golden, as the
Court suggested, it does not follow that the AMI is unbeneficial to the
estate in land. The presence of a personal benefit is not mutually exclusive
of the possibility that the AMI was “so related to the land as to enhance its
value and confer a benefit upon it.”43
This implicit characterization provided by Beeter is at odds with the
Court’s determination that the language of the Universal-Tipperary
assignment is ambiguous. That is, the observation that the AMI may or
may not relate to the transferred assets reflects an implicit indecision about
the nature of the AMI provision at issue in the case. On one hand, the court
implied that the AMI cannot relate to either of the leasehold estates for the
purpose of benefiting them. On the other hand, the Court said it was
possible that the AMI was related to the leasehold estate for purposes of
delegation. This indecision is best highlighted in the two interpretations of
the assignment offered by the litigants, SM Energy and Golden, and the
underlying competing notions of how, and if, the AMI “relates” to the
Original Lease and Federal leasehold.
Pursuant to the Universal-Tipperary assignment, Tipperary assumed
“contracts to the extent that they relate to any of the Assets.”44 Of course,
the Court was not clear as to which of the assets (i.e., the Original Lease or
Federal leasehold) the AMI must “relate” to before the obligation is
assumed. Golden’s reading of the assignment implies that an AMI “relates”
to existing assets, including the Original Lease and Federal leaseholds,
whereas SM Energy’s reading of the assignment provides that an AMI
covenant can only “relate” to future acquired assets—that is, only those
assets Universal would acquire in the future.45 This tension highlights the
fact that the ambiguity perceived by the court was really a latent ambiguity
in the characterization of the AMI. If the AMI cannot “benefit” the land for
purposes of being characterized as a real covenant, but only confers a
personal benefit as implied in the Beeter reference, how can it be said to
“relate” to a present vested real estate interest? A closer look at what it

42. See, e.g., Petroleum Exchange v. Poynter, 64 N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1954); GeoStar
Corp. v. Parkway Petroleum, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 61, 67 (N.D. 1993) (holding that the overriding
royalty interest is estate in realty).
43. See generally Mullendore Theatres, Inc. v. Growth Realty Investors Co., 691 P.2d 970
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
44. Golden, ¶ 3, 826 N.W.2d at 614.
45. Id. ¶12, 826 N.W.2d at 617.
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means to “benefit” an estate for purposes of defining a real covenant seems
to suggest that Golden’s reading of the assignment—that the AMI related to
the Original and Federal leaseholds—is not a plausible interpretation of the
Universal-Tiperrary assignment.
IV. REAL COVENANTS IN NORTH DAKOTA
The analysis of real covenants under the common law presents a
similar question as that posed by the Universal-Tipperary assignment—is
the covenant so related to the land to confer a benefit or enhance its value?
North Dakota’s law concerning real covenants is codified at North Dakota
Century Cody section 47-04-24 et seq. The benefit requirement treated in
Beeter is derived from North Dakota Century Code section 47-04-26, which
provides that “[a]ll covenants contained in a grant of an estate in real
property, which are made for the direct benefit of the property or some part
of it then in existence, run with the land.”46 The section of the code
immediately following provides:
A covenant for the addition of some new thing to real property, or
for the direct benefit of some part of the property not then in
existence or annexed thereto, when contained in a grant of an
estate in such property and made by the covenantor expressly for
the covenantor’s assigns or to the assigns of the covenantee, runs
with the land so far only as the assigns thus mentioned are
concerned.47
These provisions of the North Dakota Century Code are the product of
an early attempt to bring order to the notoriously arcane law of real
covenants. Derived from the “Field Code,” these provisions are a
codification of substantive New York law undertaken by David Dudley
Field and enacted in the Dakota Territory in 1866. The above-quoted
sections 47-04-26 and 27 specifically codified the rule in Spencer’s Case.48
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-26 (1999).
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-27 (1999).
48. Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (K.B. 1583). North Dakota has no case law
addressing the meaning or effect of Section 47-04-27 on the running of covenants. Section 27
shares the same origin of identical provisions in Montana, South Dakota and California. All were
copied from New York’s “Field Code” (published in 1865) and adopted by the Dakotas in 1866.
Montana and South Dakota—like North Dakota—have no authoritative case law addressing the
meaning or effect of section 47-04-27 on the running of covenants. An unpublished Montana
decision does cite the provision to uphold a covenant subjecting successor purchasers to the rules
of a homeowners association not yet in existence). See Lewis v. Ponderosa Pines Ranch Prop.
Owners Ass’n, 126 P.3d 507 (Mont. 2005) (unpublished). California, on the other hand, has
extensive commentary on the code corollary of section 47-04-27—namely California Code section
1464, repealed 1997. California adopted the Field Code in 1872 along with sections 1462 and
1464 (repealed 1997)—the corollaries of N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-04-26 and 27, respectively.
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Although David Field compiled the code with a Benthamian vision of
displacing the common law, the adopting states, including North Dakota,
almost immediately began supplementing their application of Code
provisions with common law principles.49 For example, the itemized
covenants of section 47-04-26 of the Code were early treated as a general
guiding principal rather than an exclusive list for construing covenants that
run with the land.50
At common law, a real covenant is a “covenant so connected with
realty that either the right to enforce or the duty to perform passes to assigns
of the land.”51 For a covenant to run with the land, a party seeking
enforcement needed to establish four elements: (1) horizontal; (2) vertical
privity; (3) intent that the covenant run; and (4) the covenant must “touch
and concern” the land.52 The difficulty of interpreting real covenants arises
most often in the context of the fourth element—whether the covenant can
be said to “touch and concern” an estate in land.53 Showing that Spencer is
alive and well, Beeter’s benefit principal derives from the common law
requirement that the covenant ‘touch and concern’ an estate in land.54
The “touch and concern” element of the real covenant analysis has its
origins in a 1583 English decision known as Spencer’s Case.55 The facts of
Spencer’s Case involve a covenant between a lessor and lessee, providing
that the lessee erect a brick wall upon the leased premises. Spencer taught
that for a covenant to run, it must explicitly bind assignees and it must
“touch and concern” the land. At its best, the legacy of the “touch and
concern” doctrine has been one of confusion. The most well-known

Commentaries on these sections identify Section 1464 squarely as a derivative of the rule in
Spencer’s Case. See Repeal of Civil Code Section 1464: The First Rule in Spencer’s Case, 26
CAL. L. REV. COMM. REPORTS 29, 33 (1996).
49. See Robert G. Natelson, Running With the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV. 17, 3941 (1990).
50. For a discussion of the creation, adoption and use of the Field Code in the Dakotas, see
William B. Fisch, The Dakota Civil Code: More Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 45 N.D.
L. REV. 9 (1968); Natelson, supra note 49, at 39-41; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McClure, 81
N.W. 52, 55 (N.D. 1899) (observing that the code does not provide an exclusive list of possible
real covenants provided in the common law, but only examples of those covenants); Reeves & Co.
v. Russell, 148 N.W. 654-9 (N.D. 1914) (observing that the common law was adopted by code
revisions in 1905 to provide rights and remedies not identified in statute).
51. Charles E. Clark, The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connection with Real Covenants,
32 YALE L.J. 123, 123 (1922).
52. Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 74.
53. Cf. Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App. 1983) (holding that an
AMI did not run because privity was lacking between the parties where the original leasehold had
expired). The Court opined that after the leasehold had terminated, the AMI could only be
enforced as a personal covenant. See id. at 727.
54. Beeter v. Sawyer Disposal LLC, 2009 ND 153, ¶ 10, 711 N.W.2d, 282, 286.
55. Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 74.
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attempt to provide a workable order to the case law is the analysis provided
by Professor Henry Bigelow.56 Bigelow distilled the case law following
Spencer’s Case to identify two categories of real covenants: (1) those
imposing limitations upon the rights that form a part of the title to land; and
(2) those whose connection with the land is in the character of the benefit
conferred.57 It is the second category—those that pivot upon character of
the benefit—that is particularly significant to a discussion of the AMI.
A. THE BIGELOW TEST AND CHARACTERIZING THE BENEFIT
Essentially, Bigelow’s test of whether the covenant runs with the land
rests on whether it materially affects the promisor’s legal relationship to the
land.58 An effect is material if the covenant renders an interest of the estate
holder more or less valuable. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court
has never explicitly acknowledged Bigelow’s analysis as the source of its
real covenants understanding, it has nevertheless implicitly adopted the test.
Opining on section 47-04-26, the Beeter Court articulated that standard,
observing that a covenant which is not “so related to the land as to enhance
its value and confer a benefit upon it does not run with the land . . . is a
collateral and personal obligation.”59 According to Bigelow, the benefit or
value must arise out of the legal relations of the parties as owner of interests
in the estate and not merely their generic interests as citizens. 60 Otherwise,
“where the covenant is of such a nature that the performance of it might
equally well be made to enure to the benefit of any given person” the
covenant must be personal.61 Bigelow’s analysis determing the nature of
the covenant’s effect on title essentially involves two questions—the first is
a question of fact and the second is a question of law: (1) what privilege or
power of the covenantee is the covenant primarily designed to and does
protect; and (2) is the privilege or power in question possessed by
covenantee by virtue of his estate in land?62 If the covenant does not
protect a privilege incident to an estate in land, it does not run.
56. Harry A. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH L. REV. 639 (1914).
See 6A RICHARD W. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROP. 673[2][a] (1994);
see also Michael J. D. Sweeney, The Changing Role of Private Land Restrictions: Reforming
Servitude Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 672 (1995) (observing that a majority of courts have
adopted Bigelow’s test for determining whether a covenant can be said to touch and concern a
given estate).
57. Bigelow, supra note 56, at 652.
58. Id. at 639.
59. Beeter, ¶10, 771 N.W.2d at 286 (citations omitted); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McClure,
81 N.W. 52, 55 (N.D. 1899) (reiterating the common law test of real covenants).
60. Bigelow, supra note 56, at 645.
61. Id. at 645-46.
62. Id. at 646.
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Bigelow illustrates the distinction between those benefits that relate to
the land and those that enure to the benefit of any generic person by
comparing two promises that might be exchanged between a lessor and
lessee. First, the lessor may require the lessee to deliver to him all the grain
grown upon the demised premises; second, the lessee may require the lessor
to maintain windbreaks upon the demised premises. According to Bigelow,
the former of these promises would not run, while the latter would. The
difference between the two being that the promise to deliver grain (just as
the promise to deliver landfill profits in Beeter) benefits only the lessor, not
as the owner of revisionary interest in the land, but as the owner of a
chattel; whereas the promise to erect windbreaks “operates directly to make
more valuable the exercise of the privilege of raising grain.”63
Of course, a promise that runs with the land will necessarily affect the
value of that land. For this reason, the Bigelow test has drawn criticism as
being circular in its logic.64 Of course, this problem can be avoided if the
effect of a promise concerning land can be evaluated independently of its
effect on successive interests in title. Nevertheless, the circular nature of
the test is also instructive in understanding a fundamental aspect of real
covenant laws. Namely, the covenant must directly operate to benefit the
land. Bigelow remarks that a covenant does not run if it only “indirectly or
mediately operate[s] to the benefit of the covenantee with respect to his
rights as owner of the soil.”65 Accordingly, the outcome of this analysis
often depends upon how the reviewing court first characterizes the intended
benefit of the covenant as conceived by the executing parties. Many
covenants—like the AMI—can have many benefits, some direct and some
collateral, including their direct effect on successive interests in title.
Thus, given this potential for confusing the direct and collateral
benefits of covenants, it becomes clear that the crucial determination of the
Bigelow test is how a given court chooses to characterize the benefit of the
covenant. Comparison is useful to illustrate the narrow margin of certain
scenarios that arise under the Bigelow test in this context. Bigelow
provides an example of two divergent treatments of the “privilege” or
“right” protected by a non-compete agreement. Two cases, Thomas v.
Haywood66 and Norman v. Wells67 were decided on identical facts: a lessor
covenanted not to sell liquor within a mile of a saloon he leased to his
63. Id.
64. See Sweeney, supra note 56, at 678; JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY
962, 1037 n.56 (1981) (observing that the logic of the Bigelow test is circular).
65. Bigelow, supra note 56, at 646.
66. L. R. 4 Ex. 311 (1869).
67. 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 136 (1837).
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lessee.68 The court in Thomas held that the covenant was not enforceable
by the lessee’s successor-in-title, as the benefit enured to the lessee’s
financial benefit as a vendor.69 The Norman court reached the opposite
conclusion and construed the benefit of the non-compete covenant as a
privilege of selling liquor in a particular place rather than a privilege solely
related to his rights in chattel.
The significance of the Norman case and the illustration of the
treatment of non-compete covenants is two-fold. First, these cases touch
upon the running of a non-compete covenant, the benefit of which is
directly analogous to a benefit of the AMI. Second, Norman is a New York
case of the Field Code variety. While North Dakota has ostensibly
recognized the running of non-compete covenants, the reasoning
underpinning Norman also arguably introduces to the Field Code states a
precedent for construing the promised benefit in the context of the unique
circumstances of the estate.70 That is, the respective holdings of Thomas
and Norman can be distinguished in how each court considers the privilege
of selling liquor in context of the estate itself—whereas the Thomas court
conceptually separates the right to the profit of the land from the business
conducted on it, the Norman Court considers the business conducted on the
land as a privilege or right appurtenant to the lessor’s estate in land.71
B. FINAL THOUGHTS ON REAL COVENANT ANALYSIS
These observations lead to a final point regarding a much more
intuitive aspect to real covenants—namely, the fact that a particular
privilege or benefit contained in a covenant must be evaluated in the context
of unique privileges and limitations of a given estate.72 This point is
particularly true of oil and gas leasehold or mineral estates.73 The oil and
68. Bigelow, supra note 56, at 651.
69. Id.
70. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McClure, 81 N.W. 52, 55 (N.D. 1899) (observing that non-compete
covenants run with the land at common law).
71. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-04-26 (1943).
72. See WILLIAMS & MYERS, supra note 13, § 202.1. The unique status of an oil and gas
leasehold vis a vis adjoining landowners is observed in Colorado. See, Maralax Res., Inc. v.
Chamberlain, No. 12CA2575, 2014 WL 43531 (Colo. App. Jan. 2, 2014). Here, the court granted
an oil and gas lessee standing to maintain a prescriptive easement claim against an adjoining
landowner because of its character as real property. The court observed “[b]ecause of the unique
nature and purposes of oil and gas leases, we do not agree that common law landlord-tenant
principles apply to determine whether an oil and gas lessee has standing to maintain a prescriptive
easement claim.” Id. at 11.
73. The leasehold and constituent rights in royalties are considered real property in North
Dakota. Petroleum Exchange v. Poynter, 64 N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1954); GeoStar Corp. v.
Parkway Petroleum, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 61, 67 (N.D. 1993) (holding that the overriding royalty
interest is estate in realty). Clearly AMIs can be employed in the conveyance of mineral or fee
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gas leasehold exists to facilitate the exploration and production of mineral
rights in land for the realization of profit in form of royalties—which can
also be treated as a separate estate in land. The leasehold is uniquely
limited by a term extended only by active operation. Profit from the
development is the only benefit to the estate.
Consider again the facts of Beeter where an agreement is made to
convey property in exchange for passive profits from a landfill business
conducted upon the land. In Golden, the plaintiff retained a right in passive
profits in the form of a discrete estate in the leasehold, an overriding-royalty
interest. This comparison illustrates the uniqueness of the leasehold estate
and its appurtenant rights—what was a personal covenant in Beeter is an
estate in land in Golden.
Yet the facts of Beeter are a poor analogy for understanding the benefit
of the AMI for another reason. In the confines of the unique and limited
uses of an oil and gas leasehold, the AMI operated as a covenant not to
compete between two parties on adjoining leaseholds, and directly affected
the prospects of leasehold development on the Original Leasehold estate in
which both parties had vested interests. Thus, when asking the question
under Bigelow’s analysis (i.e., what privilege or power is the AMI covenant
designed to and does protect?), it becomes clear that the privileges and the
powers of the oil and gas leasehold must be considered with the
understanding that oil and gas development, for the realization of profit, is
the sole end of the oil and gas leasehold.
While the continued relevance and viability of the common law
conception of real convent is debated,74 Bigelow’s test remains the law of
many oil and gas producing states, including North Dakota. Reviewing
Bigelow’s analysis of real covenants, we see that the question implied in
Golden—that is, does the AMI “relate” to the Original or Federal
Leaseholds?—is the same question that would have been posed in a
covenant analysis under Bigelow. The consideration of the privilege or
power the AMI covenant is designed to protect must be asked in the unique
context of the rights and privileges of the leasehold estate.

estates. However, the typical absence of a term in these conveyance creates a unique set of
problems that I do not evaluate here.
74. Some states, like California, have overhauled their statues governing covenants over
concerns about the relevance of, and arcane qualities of, real covenants—particularly with the
inconsistency of the first rule in Spencer’s Case with modern priorities. Sweeney, supra note 56,
at 678.
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V. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE AMI AGREEMENT
I’ve highlighted the tension at the heart of Golden’s passing
characterization of the AMI covenant and its holding concerning the
language of assignment.75 In light of the law of real covenants in North
Dakota, it becomes clear that Golden’s characterization of the AMI as a
covenant without a direct benefit to the land presupposes that it has no
relationship or (at best) an attenuated relationship to the Original and
Federal Leaseholds. This raises the question of how the AMI ought to be
characterized as they relate to leasehold estates under the rubric of the
Bigelow Test.
AMIs appear in many contexts, and as a result, have been characterized
in a number of different ways by legal commentators. The Golden Court
itself relied upon an early assessment by Dante Zarlengo of the AMI
provision and its nature as a covenant.76 Zarlengo argued that the
obligations of the AMI should be treated as a form of option contract,
suggesting that:
an area of mutual interest clause does not directly affect ownership
of the particular oil and gas leases to be conveyed. It does not alter
in any way the rights of an oil and gas lessee to go upon the land
and produce oil and gas, pay delay rentals, or [have] the right to
production from the oil and gas lease.77
Accordingly, Zarlengo argues that the AMI passes to successors-in-title as
they take title subject to contracts containing AMI obligations—“[w]hether
or not these obligations were assumed by a party acquiring oil and gas
leases subject to an area of mutual interest clauses is a question of intent,
and all the surrounding circumstances must be evaluated to determine that
intent.”78 The Golden Court’s analysis builds upon the foundation Zarlengo
lays, assuming the legal character of the AMI and focusing on intent.79
The same year that Zarlengo published his article, the Texas Supreme
Court decided Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., holding
that an AMI could run with the land.80 In response to the Westland
decision, Angus Earl McSwain criticized the Court’s notion that the AMI
75. Golden, ¶ 9, 826 N.W.2d at 615. Construing the AMI as a personal covenant because of
the lack of intent does not create this problem. It is the Golden Court’s citation of Beeter that
creates this tension.
76. Id. ¶ 11, 826 N.W. 2d at 616.
77. See generally Dante L. Zarlengo, Area of Mutual Interest Clauses Regarding Oil and
Gas Properties: Analysis, Drafting, and Procedure, 28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 14 (1982).
78. Id. at 859-60.
79. Golden, ¶ 11, 826 N.W.2d at 616.
80. Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. 1982).
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could confer a benefit to the land: “[a] contract to do something which
bears no relation to the use or value of the land cannot operate to benefit or
burden assigns” despite the intentions of the parties.81 The AMI’s purpose
in Westland, McSwain argues, was “not to affect the use or value of
[acreage within the AMI] but rather to induce the conveyance thereof.”82
McSwain likens the AMI in Westland to a purchase money mortgage—a
contract that “deals with, and is tied to the land or interest conveyed, but its
basis is found in the terms of the conveyance of the property and not in its
effect upon the land.”83 Like Zarlengo, McSwain argues that that the type
of covenant represented by the AMI, like the purchase money mortgage,
can be binding on an assignee “only when he expressly assumes it and not
when he merely takes the estate ‘subject to’ the lien.”84
More recently, Terry Cross has argued for a more focused analysis of
the AMI contract itself and its context.85 Cross acknowledges a practical
need for a mechanism to bind successive interest holders in the contexts of
certain agreements that facilitate leasehold development.86 While Zarlengo
argues that the AMI is always a de facto personal covenant, Cross
conversely suggests that the initial focus should be on analyzing the AMI
covenant itself—identifying the original interest burdened “and remain
focused on those burdened interests” when considering the benefit of the
AMI.87 The few court decisions addressing the issue of whether AMIs can
or should run with the land are split along these same lines: between
assuming the character of the AMI and employing a willingness to evaluate
the benefit in context of the intended purposes of the transaction of rights.
The Zarlengo/McSwain assumption creates two problems. First, this
approach leaves the parties to the AMI at the mercy of the commitment of
the opposite party in assuring its interests are preserved in future
assignments. The inefficacy of this approach is highlighted in Golden
because Golden was left to rely on Universal, now long gone, to clearly
delegate and assign the AMI’s provisions. Second, the assumption that the
AMI (to borrow McSwain’s language describing Westlands’ AMI) “bears
no relation to the use or value of the land” can force perverse reasoning
when interpreting relatively common assignment language. Zarlengo’s

81. Angus E. McSwain, Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil: New Uncertainties as
to Scope of Title Search, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 629, 636 (1983).
82. Id. at 641.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally Cross, supra note 8.
86. Id. at 218.
87. Id. at 220.
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problem is the Golden dilemma: if courts are to assume the AMI can have
no relation to the use of value of the property as an initial premise, it is then
inconsistent to consider whether or not the parties intended the AMIs to
relate to and benefit the demised property. But, as we shall see, courts
consistently find that AMIs do relate to the demised premises – at least
insofar as they function to facilitate development and reward risk. Further,
under Zarlengo’s analysis, any relationship between the AMI and demised
property is per se attenuated and incidental, and obligations of an AMI
could only conceivably be assigned where they are expressly assigned.
This is a preferable way (at least conceptually) of preventing AMIs from
acting like a runaway train in title succession, but it also creates a complete
bar to interest holders from employing an important protection of structured
arrangements of risk and capital in cooperative development agreements.
A. CHARACTERIZING THE AMI AGREEMENT
AMI covenants commonly appear in agreements affecting oil and gas
assets in regions where little exploration has occurred.88 The nature of an
AMI is a contract to convey an interest in oil and gas lease interests.89 The
AMI requires that parties acquiring interest within a defined area: (1) give
notice to all parties of any acquisition and its terms within the defined area;
and (2) provide to all parties of the agreement an option to participate in the
acquisition for a specified period of time.90 The anticipated interest of an
AMI typically includes leaseholds or mining rights, but can be broad
enough to include surface and mineral rights as well.91 Commentators have
characterized or analogized the AMI to option contracts, preferential-rightto-purchase agreements, purchase money mortgages, or non-compete
agreements.92 AMIs may appear independently or as part of joint operating
agreements, farmout agreements, confidentiality agreements, earn-in
agreements, or as part of a leasehold assignment.93
The typical motivation for parties entering into an AMI agreement is to
provide protection for geological data, reduce risk and cost, spread risk,
88. Zarlengo, supra note 77, at 859-60.
89. John S. Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 SW. L.J. 759, 844 (1987).
90. Gary B. Conine, Property Provisions of the Operating Agreement—Interpretation,
Validity, and Enforceability, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1263, 1346-47 (1988).
91. Mark T. Nesbitt, Area of Interest Provisions—Two Edged Swords, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. § 21.02[2] (1989).
92. See Zarlengo supra note 77, at 859-60; Cross, supra note 8, at 215-20; Conine, supra
note 90, at 1346-47. But see Hultberg v. City of Garrison, 56 N.W.2d 319, 322 (N.D. 1953)
(holding that an option to purchase real property is a privilege given by the owner to the optionee,
and vests in the optionee no interest in the property until he has accepted the option and becomes
obligated thereby in accordance with its terms).
93. See Quigley & Hull, supra note 8, at 4.
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organize investments, and in conjunction with a MUI provision,94 guarantee
the participation of sufficiently capitalized parties.95 The primary purpose
of the AMI is to increase the likelihood of leasehold or mineral
development. The AMI often represents an equitable division of, and
participation in, interests acquired on the basis of joint expenditure and
information.96 In context of joint operating agreements, these provisions
permit parties to “insure a fair distribution of any benefits derived from the
joint investment of the parties and the information and data obtained from
joint operations.”97 The practical effect of the AMI is to limit competition
within a given geographic area.98 An AMI executed within the context of a
confidentiality agreement has the effect of creating unilateral obligation.99
AMIs typically appear in one of four scenarios.100 First, similarly
situated parties will execute an AMI to limit competition and avoid costs
related to seismic options or leases and spread the risk of acquisition,
exploration, and development. Parties in this scenario will likely be in
equal bargaining positions. Second, an independent producer with the
technical and operational expertise, but limited geological and geophysical
data, can use an AMI provision to define the areas where passive investors
will fund future acquisitions. This will create a “take-it or leave it”
situation for willing investors. Third, and similar to the second scenario, an
AMI may be used in situations where a development company with an
otherwise strong lease position, data and technical and operational expertise
is seeking to spread risk of exploration and production.101 This situation
will likewise create a “take-it or leave it” situation for willing investors.
94. The “maintenance of uniform interest,” or “MUI” provision allows the smooth operation
of the AMI over time. Cross, supra note 8, at 220. The MUI serves to either prevent non-uniform
assignment of interests subject to an AMI, or otherwise allocate responsibility under the AMI
when parties to the original agreement assign an unequal undivided interests. Id. at 222.
95. Id. at 214-15.
96. Anita Gefreh Himebaugh, An Overview of Oil and Gas Contracts In the Williston Basin,
59 N.D. L. REV. 7, 32 (1983).
97. Conine, supra note 90, at 1337. Conine observes that in jurisdictions that treat joint
operating agreements as joint ventures, the need for these sort of assurances are lessened by the
presence of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1337-38. North Dakota does not imply a joint venture when
joint operating agreements are formed without an implied or express contract to that effect. But
see Come Big or Stay Home, LLC v. EOG Res., Inc., 2012 ND 91, 816 N.W.2d 80 (observing that
JOA did not create a joint venture and that parties to a JOA were not co-tenants).
98. Cross, supra note 8, at 215.
99. Quigley & Hall, supra note 8, § 38.05(2)(a).
100. See generally Allen D. Cummings, Area of Mutual Interest Agreements, 2010 No. 2
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. Paper No. 10.
101. Id. An example of an arrangement under scenarios two and three might include a
“promoted deal” wherein a promoter finds a drilling prospect and seeks passive investment as to
the start-up costs. The initial well is drilled with the investors’ money with advance agreement as
to the respective rights of the parties to participate in future wells—this agreement constituting the
“mutual area of interest.” See Evertson v. Cannon, 411 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Neb. 1987).
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Finally, an AMI is used in situations where individual players, like landmen
or petroleum engineers operating as individuals, will seek to leverage their
respective positions (be it a leasehold interest or geological/geophysical
information) with larger players such as exploration and production
companies.102 This situation is similar to that presented in Golden v. SM
Energy Company. The individual will seek to strengthen his position by
seeking an AMI covering a large area with a long term and covering a broad
range of property interests, as well as bind successors-in-interest.
B. THE AMI IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
To date, relatively few court cases have addressed the nature of the
AMI in terms of real covenant jurisprudence. The handful of cases that
address the issue provide different answers or inferences to questions raised
by the analysis. These cases illustrate both the diversity of circumstance in
which the AMI can arise, and highlight the value and benefit that the AMI
confers upon present vested leasehold estates. A brief review is helpful in
understanding the AMI in context of its actual use, and is also helpful for
two reasons. First, these cases are helpful in understanding how the AMI
can operate to increase the probability of the leasehold development.
Second, these cases illustrate the unavoidable relationship between the AMI
and the vested interest of developers of the leasehold estate.
In Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil, the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether an AMI could burden successive interests-intitle.103 Westland Oil Development (“Westland”) entered into a farmout
agreement dated, August 4, 1966, with Mobil Oil Corporation (“Mobil”)
covering Mobil’s multiple leasehold interests. Westland later assigned its
interest in the farmout to a partnership, Chambers and Kennedy (“C&K”),
along with the obligations of an AMI provision executed between Westland
and Mobile contained in a November 15, 1966, letter agreement.104 C&K
102. See generally Cummings, supra note 100.
103. 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982). Westland is not the first Texas case to deal with the AMI.
In 1953, an appeals court in Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 258 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
App. 1953), observed that an AMI provision did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
Although not specifically identifying the provision as an AMI, the court nevertheless observed
that it did not create right in real property at all but simply gave to predecessors a property right
contingent on defendant’s purchase of royalties, mineral interests or fee titles in area. Id. at 393.
104. The AMI provision read as follows:
[i]f any of the parties hereto, their representatives or assigns, acquire any additional
leasehold interests affecting any of the lands covered by said farmout agreement, or
any additional interest from Mobil Oil Corporation under lands in the area of the
farmout acreage, such shall be subject to the terms and provisions of this agreement;
provided, however that in no event shall the owners of the working interest under any
portion of such acreage be entitled to less than 75% working interest leases.
Westland, 637 S.W.2d at 905.
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fulfilled the obligations of the August 4, 1966, farmout between Westland
and Mobile, and Mobile duly assigned the earned acreage to C&K. Mobil
later executed a farmout agreement with Bernard Hanson by letter
agreement dated April 18, 1972, covering lands within the Westland/Mobile
farmout, agreeing to assign interest to Hanson in exchange for drilling a test
well at a specified depth.105 Hanson later entered into a similar farmout
agreement with C&K covering similar acreage, including acreage derived
from the agreement with Westland covered by the November 15, 1966,
letter agreement.106 Hanson then assigned these agreements to Gulf Oil
Corporation (“Gulf”) and Superior Oil Company (“Superior”).107 When
Westland learned of the assignment from Mobil pursuant to these farmouts,
Westland brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the November
15, 1966, agreement’s provisions were valid and binding on the leasehold
interests acquired by Gulf and Superior.108
Addressing the question of whether the AMI could be considered to
touch and concern the land, the court determined that the AMI did run with
the land, observing that “the promise to convey the prescribed interests in
the leases . . . clearly affected the nature and value of the estate
conveyed . . . . It burdened the promisor’s estate and could be considered to
have rendered it less valuable.”109 Although the Westland Court wanders
into the circular reasoning of the Bigelow analysis, the court’s holding
implicitly acknowledges a benefit independent of the effect of the AMI on
successors-in-title. McSwain sees the AMI as purposed “not to affect the
use or value” of the initial leasehold, but purposed to “induce” the
conveyance.110 It is difficult to see how increasing the marketability of the
leasehold did “not affect the use or value” of the leasehold estate. The AMI
initially served to increase the possible return on any risk assumed by
parties developing the original leasehold, increasing the potential profit of
the initial venture. From Mobil’s perspective, the AMI promised an
increased return of initial investment and greatly increased the likelihood
that developers would undertake the risk of developing the leasehold.111

105. Id. at 906.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 907.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 911.
110. McSwain, supra note 81, at 641. To be consistent with Bigelow’s analysis, it would be
more appropriate to say that the AMI does not directly affect the use or value of the leasehold. It
is clear that it does.
111. Subsequent court decisions have questioned whether Westland Oil Development had not
altered Texas’ “touch and concern” analysis by removing “the benefit analysis” from the calculus.
See In re El Paso Refinery, LP, 302 F.3d 343, 356 (5th Cir. 2002).
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In Kansas, the courts have declared the AMI to be a personal covenant.
One case, however, offers an example of a dispute over the conveyance of a
benefited estate. In Slawson Exploration Co., Inc. v. Vintage Petroleum,
Inc.,112 the Tenth Circuit applied Kansas’ contract law to the interpretation
of an assignment of AMI attendant to a leasehold interest in Montana.
Slawson Exploration (“Slawson”) entered into a participation and operating
agreement with Oryx Energy Company, formerly Sun Exploration
Company (“Sun/Oryx”), to produce a leasehold situated in Richland
County, Montana.113 The participation agreement (i.e., the AMI) provided
that the parties would explore and jointly develop an area of mutual interest
with the reciprocal obligation of offering each respective party an option to
participate in future acquisitions at its proportionate interest. Slawson
drilled the Tiller #1-9 Well pursuant to the operating agreement on a
leasehold within the AMI.114 Slawson later assigned to Vintage Petroleum,
Inc. (“Vintage”) all its right, title, and interest in several properties,
including the Tiller #1-9 Well. The exhibit to the assignment described the
property interest and provided the qualification that the “assignment is
expressly limited to the spacing unit for the Tiller #1-9 Well, being the E/2
NE/4 Section 9, and all of Section 10, T25, R55E, Roosevelt MT.”115
Following the Slawson/Vintage assignment, Sun/Oryx recompleted the
Tiller #1-9 Well at a deeper formation, and pursuant to Montana’s
conservation laws, expanded the Tiller #1-9 spacing unit from 160 to 320
acres by acquiring additional leaseholds adjacent to the existing well.116
Sun/Oryx notified Slawson of the acquisition and of its belief that Vintage
owed the additional acreage under the AMI. Slawson subsequently brought
an action seeking declaratory judgment that it, and not Vintage, owed the
additional interest under the AMI. The court reviewed the language of the
assignment conveying unto Vintage “all agreements, leases . . . and other
instruments in any way related [to the Tiller well and spacing unit]” and
determined that the AMI agreement “related to” the discrete well interest
112. Slawson Exploration Co., Inc. v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir.
1996). The Supreme Court of Kansas characterized the AMI as a personal covenant several years
before Slawson in context of considering whether the AMI would violate the rule against
perpetuities. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma City v. Sidwell Corp., 678 P.2d 118,
126 (Kan. 1984) (citing the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 401 (1944)). Answering the
question of whether an AMI without a term would be barred by the rule against perpetuities, the
court observed that the AMI is purely contractual and does not create right in property: “[t]he
contract here did not involve the vesting of future interest in real property and did not constitute a
restraint upon the alienation of that property.” Id.
113. Slawson, 78 F.3d at 1480.
114. Id. at 1481.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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assigned to Vintage and held that Vintage was the proper recipient of the
right to participate in additional acreage under the AMI.117
The Slawson Court evaluated assignment language nearly identical to
the language of the Universal-Tipperary assignment considered in Golden.
In both cases, the assignor purported to assign all rights that “relate” to the
demised premises. In Slawson, however, the court did not balk at
determining that Slawson’s original “participation rights” were
unambiguously “related” to the Tiller Well.118 In reaching this conclusion,
the court highlighted a distinction Slawson made between the demised
premises and those adjoining properties “that would be useful in
developing” a yet undeveloped and adjoining well prospect.119 The
significance of this distinction is that it subtly implies that the perceived
relationship between the AMI and the demised property turns upon the
assignor’s perception of the benefit of the AMI to the usefulness of
developing the Tiller Well. The underpinning assumption of Slawson’s
holding is that the AMI inheres to the development of the leasehold’s estate
rather than existing as a disembodied contractual benefit.
The AMI often represents an equitable division of and participation in
interests acquired on the basis of joint expenditure and information. The
equitable operation of the AMI in the second scenario is illustrated in a
Colorado case—Kincaid v. Western Operating Co.120 In Kincaid, a
producer and several passive investors executed an operating agreement to
develop multiple leaseholds in multiple township sections, including a
section where the parties only possessed fifty percent of a particular
leasehold interest.121 After success drilling several wells, the operator
obtained the remaining fifty percent leasehold interest without providing
notice to the parties who provided the initial investment.122 Although these
investing parties did not execute an AMI with the original operating
agreement, the court chose to impose an AMI to effect the implicit intent of
the parties in the initial agreement and prevent unfair advantage.123
The Kincaid court imposed the AMI to maintain the equities between
the parties in a development partnership. Presumably, the developer in
Kincaid wsa in the best position to realize the potential of the initial
117. Id. at 1482.
118. The court considers the effect of the assignment language as it is qualified by
definitions in the accompanying exhibit. Id. The court rejects Slawson’s argument that the
exhibit demonstrates its intent to assign the well and not the participation rights.
119. Id. at 1483.
120. 890 P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1994).
121. Id. at 251.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 253.
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prospect as well as obtain the remaining interest related to that prospect,
giving the developer an unfair access to a significant benefit of leasehold
development—market positioning. Of course, Kincaid offers no explicit
commentary on the relationship between the AMI and the leasehold estate
held by the passive investors. But implicitly, the court’s holding reflects
the integral purpose of the AMI to the development of the initial leasehold.
The scenario presented in Kincaid is also interesting insomuch as it shows
an AMI operating in a much more intimate proximity to the vested estates
in land. It also demonstrates how the AMI operates to divide the unique
risks and benefits of oil and gas leasehold development. Here, the AMI
covenant, conceived and imposed as a necessary enablement to the
development of a leasehold estate and imposed for realization of the benefit
of royalty estates, could be characterized as a “benefit” to an estate in land
entirely independent of its affect of successive title interest—this is
particularly true in the context of passive investors whose interest in the
leasehold is solely for the realization of profits through development.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the merits of Golden, the reasoning by the Court was
misguided. Promulgating the presumption that the AMI cannot benefit a
present vested estate for the purpose of real covenant analysis obscures a
primary motivation behind the use of the AMI. The AMI operates directly
to facilitate a leasehold or mineral estate’s development by reducing
development risk and cost, spreading risk, organizing investments, and
guaranteeing the participation of sufficiently capitalized parties.
Furthermore, this presumption leads to confusion in the legal analysis.
Golden’s characterization of the AMI as a personal covenant is
implicitly premised upon the assumption that the AMI does not relate to the
existing leasehold estate, but in the Court’s conclusion, it sends the question
concerning the relationship of the AMI to the existing leasehold estate back
to the trial court to consider assignment. The confusion at the heart of
Golden over the relationship between the AMI and the present leasehold
estate highlights the need for a better theory of treating AMI agreements. A
better approach for analysis is to inquire into the character of the AMI in the
context of the circumstances of its creation, asking whether the AMI
confers a benefit on the leasehold estate or its appurtenant rights
independent of its effect on successors in title.
Of course, beyond the question of whether the AMI can be construed to
bind successors-in-title, is the question as to whether they should bind
successors-in-title. AMIs present several competing practical concerns,
however: first, the concern that mineral developers will inherit leaseholds
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burdened by no-longer-useful AMIs and second, the concerns that freedom
of contract and the need for mineral developers to increase incentives for
spurring development and to enter cooperative agreements with the
assurance that successive participants will not compete against parties to the
original agreement with an unfair advantage. McSwain expresses particular
concern as to the effect of permitting AMI’s to run with the land on title and
the resulting burden that will fall upon successive title holders. Under
North Dakota’s common law requirement of explicit intent,124 many AMIs
will pass—if at all—only through delegation and assumption. Otherwise,
those AMIs intended to run with the land will declare themselves.
The issue of characterizing the AMI to understand its effect on title
represents a collision of a sophisticated aspect of a modern industry with
one of the more arcane aspects of the common law—the “touch and
concern” aspect of real covenants. The AMI shares many analogous
features to established real covenants such as non-compete covenants or
option contracts—these similarities manifest both in their operation and in
their purpose to provide a necessary advantage to realizing the profit from
the estate. At common law, both covenants ran with the land.125 The
application of Bigelow’s two-part analysis126 argues for this same
conclusion when applying the facts in Golden: the AMI is principally
designed to protect Golden’s privilege of realized profit from leasehold
development, a privilege that inheres to his estate in the overriding royalty
interest. Distaste for treating AMIs as real covenants seems to arise in
circumstances, like that of Golden or Westland, where a real covenant
extends the claims of passive holders of non-participating royalty interests
or middlemen on the benefits of active production. Without a showing that
such arrangements would discourage productive development, limiting the
reach of the AMI would disadvantage development by denying parties a
practical tool for distributing the benefits and risks of market position.

124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-25.
125. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McClure, 81 N.W. 52, 55 (N.D. 1899); see also N. Grand Mall
Assocs., LLC, v. Grand Ctr., Ltd., 278 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2002) (observing that “[a] leasehold
interest is a recognized estate in land, and the option to purchase was an incident of this interest, a
covenant running with the land, good against the lessor and any successor in interest of the
lessor.”).
126. See discussion supra notes 61-62. The analysis proposed by Bigelow involves the
following two questions: (1) what privilege or power of the covenantee is the convenant primarily
designed to and does protect; and (2) is the privilege or power in question possessed by
covenantee by virtue of his estate in land?

